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We provide a test of the role of social preferences and beliefs in voluntary cooperation and its 
decline. We elicit individuals’ cooperation preferences in one experiment and use them – as 
well as subjects’ elicited beliefs – to explain contributions to a public good played repeatedly. 
We find substantial heterogeneity in people’s preferences. With simulation methods based on 
this data, we show that the decline of cooperation can be driven by the fact that most people 
have a preference to contribute less than others, rather than by their changing beliefs of 
others’ contribution over time. Universal free riding is very likely despite the fact that most 
people are not selfish. 
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In this paper we investigate the role of social preferences and beliefs for voluntary 
cooperation. This question is interesting because numerous public goods experiments have 
shown that many people contribute more to the public good than pure self-interest can easily 
explain. However, an equally important observation is that free riding increases in repeatedly 
played public good experiments across various parameters and participant pools.
1 The facts 
are clear, but their explanation is not.  
An obvious candidate for explaining the decline of cooperation was learning the free rider 
strategy. However, Andreoni (1988) showed that cooperation resumed after a restart, which is 
inconsistent with a pure learning argument. In a subsequent paper he interpreted the decline in 
cooperation “to be due to frustrated attempts at kindness, rather than learning the free-riding 
incentives” (Andreoni (1995), p. 900). Several papers since argue that contributions that are 
not due to confusion might possibly be explained by other-regarding preferences (e.g., Palfrey 
and Prisbrey (1997); Brandts and Schram (2001); Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002); Ferraro and 
Vossler (2005); Kurzban and Houser (2005)). One type of social preference – long argued by 
social psychologists (e.g., Kelley and Stahelski (1970)) – is many people’s propensity to 
cooperate provided others cooperate as well (e.g., Keser and van Winden (2000); Fischbacher, 
Gächter and Fehr (2001); Frey and Meier (2004); Croson (2007); Ashley, Ball and Eckel 
(2008); see Gächter (2007) for an overview). Such “conditional cooperation” is an interesting 
candidate for explaining the fragility of cooperation because this motivation depends directly 
on how others behave or are believed to behave. Conditional cooperators who observe (or 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984); Andreoni (1988); Andreoni (1995); Weimann (1994); 
Laury, Walker and Williams (1995); Croson (1996); Burlando and Hey (1997); Gächter and Fehr (1999); 
Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman (1999); Keser and van Winden (2000); Fehr and Gächter (2000); Park 
(2000); Masclet, Noussair, Tucker and Villeval (2003); Carpenter (2007); Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007); 
Egas and Riedl (2008); Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter (2008) and Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt and Loos 
(forthcoming). The decline of cooperation has also been observed in prisoner’s dilemma experiments. See, e.g., 
Selten and Stoecker (1986); Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1996).   2
believe) that others take a free ride, will reduce their contributions and thus contribute to the 
decline of cooperation.
2  It is unknown, however, to what extent conditional cooperation, and 
inter-individual differences in this regard, can explain (the decline of) cooperation. Our paper 
aims to shed empirical light on this question. For a related theoretical approach see Ambrus 
and Pathak (2007). 
The novelty of our paper is to combine two observations from previous research: beliefs 
about other people’s contributions matter and people differ in their cooperative preferences – 
some are free rider types, whereas others are conditional cooperators.
3 In our approach we 
measure people’s cooperation preferences in a specially-designed public good game played in 
the strategy method (called the “P-experiment”) and then observe the same people in a 
sequence of ten one-shot games (labeled the “C-experiment”), in which we also elicit their 
beliefs about others’ contributions. This allows us to quantify how preference heterogeneity 
and beliefs interact in voluntary cooperation. Specifically, we can disentangle whether 
contributions decline because of cooperation preferences and/or because of the way people 
form (and change) their beliefs about how others will behave.   
Our data from the P-experiment show that people differ strongly in their contribution 
preferences. This is consistent with previous evidence. The biggest groups of people are (i) 
conditional cooperators who cooperate if others cooperate, and (ii) free riders who never 
contribute anything, irrespective of how much others contribute. We push beyond this 
observation of preference heterogeneity by investigating how measured preferences and 
                                                 
2 Experiments on “assortative regrouping” of participants provide suggestive evidence for this explanation: in 
these experiments (e.g., Burlando and Guala (2005); Gächter and Thöni (2005); Page, Putterman and Unel 
(2005); Gunnthorsdottir, Houser and McCabe (2007)) contributors are matched up with contributors, and free 
riders with free riders. The results show that contributions are largely stabilized if free riders are moved out of 
the group. 
3 See, e.g., Fischbacher, et al. (2001); Burlando and Guala (2005); Kurzban and Houser (2005); Bardsley and 
Moffatt (2007); Kocher, Cherry, Kroll, Netzer and Sutter (2008); Herrmann and Thöni (forthcoming)).    3
beliefs are related to observed contribution behavior. We have therefore designed our 
experiments such that we can use the P-experiment to make a point prediction for each 
participant about his or her contribution in the C-experiment, given his or her beliefs.  
Our approach allows us to answer the following three questions: how do people form their 
beliefs about others’ contributions in a given period? What is the respective role of elicited 
contribution preferences and beliefs for determining contributions? How do beliefs and 
preference heterogeneity impact on the decline of cooperation?   
Our results, which we detail in Section II, answer these questions as follows: first, belief 
formation can be described as a partial adjustment of one’s belief into the direction of the 
observed contribution of others in the previous period. More specifically, beliefs in a given 
period are a weighted average of what others contributed in the previous period and one’s 
own belief in the previous period. As we will show with the help of simulation methods, our 
estimated belief formation process implies that beliefs decline only if contributions decline, 
but not vice versa. Second, contributions are significantly positively influenced by predicted 
contributions, that is, the elicited preferences. In addition to their preferences, people’s 
contributions also depend directly on their beliefs about others’ contributions. This implies 
that the P-experiment underestimates the extent of conditional cooperation that occurs in the 
C-experiment. Third, contributions decline because on average people are “imperfect 
conditional cooperators” who only partly match others’ contributions. The presence of free 
rider types is not necessary for this result; contributions also decline if everyone is an 
imperfect conditional cooperator.  
   4
I. Design and procedures 
Our basic decision situation is a standard linear public good game. The participants are 
randomly assigned to groups of four people. Each participant is endowed with 20 tokens, 
which he or she can either keep or contribute to a "project", the public good. The payoff 
function is given as  
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j
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where the public good is equal to the sum of the contributions of all group members. 
Contributing a token to the public good yields a private marginal return of 0.4 and the social 
marginal benefit is 1.6. Standard assumptions therefore predict that all group members free 
ride completely, that is, gj = 0 for all j. This leads to a socially inefficient outcome.  
The instructions (see Appendix) explained the public good problem to the participants. 
Since we want to measure subjects’ preferences as accurately as possible, we also took great 
care to ensure that the participants understood both the rules of the game and the incentives. 
Therefore, after participants had read the instructions, they had to answer ten control 
questions. The questions tested the subjects’ understanding of the comparative statics 
properties of (1), to ensure that participants are aware of their selfish incentives and the 
dilemma situation. We did not proceed until all participants had answered all questions 
correctly. We can thus safely assume that the participants understood the game. 
Within this basic setup we conducted two types of experiments. The first type of 
experiment (the "P-experiment") elicits people’s contribution preferences in a linear one-shot 
public goods game. In the second type of experiment participants make contribution choices 
in a repeatedly played linear public goods environment (labeled "C-experiment"). The C-
experiment consists of ten rounds in the random matching mode. We chose a random 
matching protocol to minimize strategic effects from repeated play. All participants play both 
types of experiments. For example, participants first go through the preference elicitation   5
experiment in the P-C sessions before making their contribution choices in the C-experiment. 
Our C-P sessions counterbalance the order of experiments to control for possible sequence 
effects. The C-P sequence allows for a particularly strong test of measured preferences 
because people experience ten rounds of decisions in the C-experiment before their 
cooperation preferences are elicited in the P-experiment. 
The rationale of the P-experiment is to elicit people’s cooperation preferences: to what 
degree are people willing to cooperate given other people’s degrees of cooperation?
4 Being 
able to observe contributions as a function of other group members’ contributions without 
using deception requires the observation of contributions that can be contingent on others’ 
contributions. Fischbacher, et al. (2001) (henceforth FGF) introduced an experimental design 
that accomplishes this task.
5 Since we use exactly the same method as FGF we refer the 
reader to FGF for all details.  
The central idea of the P-experiment is to apply a variant of the so-called “strategy 
method” (Selten (1967)). The participants’ main task in the experiment is to make two 
decisions, an “unconditional contribution” and a “conditional contribution”. In the conditional 
contribution a subject has to indicate – in an incentive compatible way – how much he or she 
wants to contribute to the public good for each rounded average contribution level of other 
group members. Specifically, participants were shown a “contribution table” of the 21 
possible values of the average contribution of the other group members (from 0 to 20) and 
were asked to state their corresponding contribution for each of the 21 possibilities. Since the 
FGF method elicits the contribution schedules in an incentive compatible way, free rider types 
have an incentive to enter a zero contribution for each of the 21 possible average contributions 
of other group members; conditional cooperators have an incentive to enter increasing 
                                                 
4 Our approach does not require eliciting a utility function since we do not need a complete preference order for 
our purposes. It is sufficient to know subjects’ best replies conditional on others’ contributions. 
5 Ockenfels (1999) developed a similar design independently of FGF.    6
contributions, and unconditional cooperators have an incentive to enter their preferred 
contribution level.
6  The experiment was only played once, and the participants knew this. We 
wanted to elicit subjects’ preferences, without intermingling preferences with strategic 
considerations.  
Participants in the P-C sessions (C-P sessions) were only informed after finishing the P-
experiment (C-experiment) that they would play another experiment. When we explained the 
C-experiment we emphasized that the groups of four would be randomly reshuffled in each 
period.
7 After each period, participants were informed about the sum of contributions in their 
group in that period. In addition to their contribution decisions, subjects also had to indicate 
their beliefs about the average contribution of the other three group members in the current 
period. In addition to their earnings from the public good experiment, we also paid 
participants based on the accuracy of their estimates.
8  
We elicited beliefs for two reasons. First, we can assess the correlation between beliefs 
and contributions, which we expect to differ between types of players. Second, by evaluating 
an elicited schedule at the elicited belief in a given period we can make a point prediction 
                                                 
6 The P-experiment is incentive compatible because a random draw selects three group members for whom the 
unconditional contribution is payoff relevant and one group member for whom the conditional contribution, 
given the average unconditional contributions of the other three members, is payoff relevant. The payoffs are 
equal to (1). See FGF or Fischbacher and Gächter (2006) for further details.  
7 The likelihood in period 1 that a player would meet another player again once during the remaining nine 
periods was 72 percent. The likelihood that the same group of four players would meet was 2.58 percent. 
However, since the experiment was conducted anonymously, subjects were unable to recognize whether they 
were matched with a particular player in the past.  
8 Participants had a financial incentive for correct beliefs, but it was small to avoid hedging. If their estimation 
was exactly right, subjects received 3 experimental money units (≈ $0.8) in addition to their other experimental 
earnings. They received 2 (1) additional money units if their estimation deviated by 1 (2) point(s) from the other 
group members' actual average contribution, and no additional money if their estimation was off the actual 
contribution by more than three points.   7
about an individual’s contributions in the C-experiment: if an individual in the P-experiment 
indicates in his or her schedule that he or she will contribute y tokens if the others contribute x 
tokens on average, then the prediction for this individual in the C-experiment is to contribute 
y tokens if he or she believes that others contribute x tokens on average.   
The sequence of experiments was reversed in the C-P sessions. The comparison of results 
from the P-experiments in the C-P sequence with those of the P-C sequence allows us to 
assess the relevance of experience with the public goods game for elicited cooperation 
preferences.  
All experiments were computerized, using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). The 
experiments were conducted in the computer lab of the University of Zurich. Our participants 
were undergraduates from various disciplines (except economics) from the University of 
Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. We conducted six 
sessions (three in the P-C sequence and three in the C-P sequence). In each of five sessions 
we had 24 participants and in one 20 participants. A post-experimental questionnaire 
confirmed that participants were largely unacquainted with one another. Our 140 participants 
were randomly allocated to the cubicles in each session, where they took their decisions in 
complete anonymity from the other subjects. On average, participants earned 35 Swiss Francs 
(roughly $30, including a show-up fee of 10 Swiss Francs).
9 Each session lasted roughly 90 
minutes.  
 
                                                 
9 During the experiment subjects earned their payoffs in “points” (according to (1) and the earnings from correct 
belief estimates). At the end of the experiment, we exchanged the accumulated sum of points at an exchange rate 
of 1 point = CHF 0.35 for the points earned in the P-experiment and at a rate of 1 point = CHF 0.07 for the 
points earned in the C-experiment.    8
II. Results 
We organize the discussion of our results as follows: In section A, we document the decline 
of cooperation. In section B, we present the extent of heterogeneity in people’s cooperation 
preferences and actual contribution patterns. In the remaining sections, we analyze behavior 
in the C-experiment. We show how subjects form their beliefs (section C) and how their 
contribution decisions are related to the elicited preferences in the P-experiment (section D). 
We conclude in section E with a simulation study in which we assess how the belief process 
and subjects’ preferences affect the decline of cooperation.  
  
A. The Decline of Cooperation 
Figure 1 sets the stage for our analysis, which aims to explain the decline of cooperation. 




















































































































































































































































FIGURE 1. MEAN BELIEFS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OVER TIME.   
   9
Figure 1 conveys four unambiguous messages. First, contributions and beliefs decline in 
six out of six sessions. Second, behavior in the six sessions is very similar. Third, 
contributions are lower than beliefs in almost all instances. Finally, mean period contributions 
and beliefs are highly significantly positively correlated in all six sessions (Spearman rank 
correlation tests, p<0.007). This finding is consistent with previous observations in public 
goods games where beliefs were elicited (e.g., Weimann (1994); Croson (2007); Neugebauer, 
et al. (Forthcoming)). 
 
B. Heterogeneous Preferences and Contributions 
Recall that we have a complete contribution schedule from each participant that indicates 
how much he or she is prepared to contribute as a function of others’ contribution. A simple 
way of characterizing heterogeneity is to look at the slope (of a linear regression) of the 
schedule and the mean contribution in the schedule. For instance, a free rider’s schedule 
consists of zero contributions for all contribution levels of other group members. Therefore, 
his slope and mean contribution are zero. An unconditional cooperator, who contributes 20 
tokens for all others’ contribution levels, has a mean contribution of 20 and a slope of zero. A 
perfect conditional cooperator, who contributes exactly the amount others contribute, has a 
slope of one and a mean contribution of 10 tokens. Figure 2A depicts the results separately for 
the C-P and the P-C experiments. The x-axis shows the slope of the schedules and the y-axis 
the average contribution in the schedule. The dots in Figure 2A correspond to individual 
observations, and the size of a dot to the number of observations it represents.  
Figure 2A shows two things. First, there is a large degree of heterogeneity.
10 Free riders 
(located at 0-0) and perfect conditional cooperators (at 1-10) are relatively the largest group of 
                                                 
10 This evidence is consistent with other studies using different methods. See, e.g., Bardsley and Moffatt (2007); 
Kurzban and Houser (2005); Burlando and Guala (2005); Kocher, et al. (2008); Muller, Sefton, Steinberg and 
Vesterlund (2008); Duffy and Ochs (Forthcoming); and Herrmann and Thöni (forthcoming).   10
subjects. We also find a few participants who contribute an unconditional positive amount 
(along the y-axis, at x=0). A large number of participants has a positive mean contribution and 
a positive slope; a few participants have a negatively-sloped schedule (that is, they contribute 
more the less others contribute). Second, the distribution between the C-P and the P-C 
sessions is very similar. Mann-Whitney tests do not allow the rejection of the null hypotheses 
that both means and slopes are equally distributed between the treatments (p>0.87).
11 Thus, 
elicitation of preferences before subjects actually experienced contributions to the public good 
(in the P-C sessions) or after (in the C-P sessions) did not affect the elicited preferences. This 
is an important finding for our interpretation that the P-experiment elicits cooperation 
preferences. It shows that participants in the C-P sessions who have experienced actual 
contribution behavior do not express different cooperation preferences than do participants in 
the P-C sessions who are inexperienced in actual game playing when they express their 
preferences.
12 
                                                 
11 In Figure 2 we looked at the slope and mean contribution of a subject’s schedule. However, qualitatively, we 
get very similar results if we look at Spearman rank order correlation coefficients, linear correlation coefficients, 
and slopes and intercepts of linear regressions. In all cases p-values of Mann-Whitney tests that compare the C-P 
and the P-C experiments yield p>0.275.  
12  The elicited contribution schedules in our study are also not significantly different from FGF (χ2-test, 
p=0.729). According to the FGF-classification, 55 percent are conditional cooperators, 23 percent are free riders, 
and the rest are unclassifiable or follow more complicated patterns. See an earlier version (Fischbacher and 








































































































FIGURE 2. HETEROGENEOUS CONTRIBUTION PREFERENCES (PANEL A) AND  
ACTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF BELIEFS (PANEL B). 
 
Figure 2B shows a scatter plot of individual slopes of linear regressions (estimated 
without intercepts) of contributions on beliefs on the x-axis, and average contributions in the 
C-experiment on the y-axis. The dot size corresponds to the number of observations. Thus, the 
construction of Figure 2B is similar to Figure 2A. As in Figure 2A, we distinguish between 
the C-P and the P-C sessions. We find no sequence effect, neither with respect to average 
contributions nor with respect to slopes (Mann-Whitney tests, p > 0.21).
13  
Figure 2B reveals considerable heterogeneity in contribution behavior. Individual average 
contributions (depicted on the y-axis) vary between 0 and 20 tokens, although most 
participants contribute fewer than ten tokens on average. Fourteen percent of all participants 
contribute exactly zero in all ten periods. We find that the individual estimated slopes of the 
schedules from the P-experiment (Figure 2A) and the slopes of individual linear contribution-
belief regressions in the C-experiments (Figure 2B) are highly significantly positively 
                                                 
13 In Figure 2A the absolute number of [0-0]-combinations in the P-experiments was as follows: 18 in the C-P 
sessions and 14 in the P-C sessions. Six (seven) people are located at [1-1] in the C-P (P-C) sessions. In the C-
experiments depicted in Figure 2B nine people are located at [0-0] in each of the C-P and the P-C sessions.   12
correlated (Spearman’s ρ=0.39, p=0.0000). Average cooperation levels in the P-experiment 
and in the C-experiment are highly correlated as well (Spearman’s ρ=0.40, p=0.0000). We 
interpret this as a first piece of evidence that expressed cooperation preferences and actual 
cooperation behavior are correlated at the individual level.  
Before we investigate the link between beliefs, preferences, and contributions, we look at 
how people form beliefs in the C-experiment. Understanding belief formation is important 
because previous evidence, and our own, suggests that beliefs have an influence on 
contributions (see section II.D). It is therefore possible that belief formation contributes to the 
decay of cooperation if beliefs decline per se, that is, independently of contributions. In 
section E we will address this possibility and a competing hypothesis suggested by our 
findings on contribution preferences (Fig. 2A) – contributions decline because people are 
imperfect conditional cooperators.  
 
C. The Formation of Beliefs 
With the help of three econometric models, we investigate the question of how people 
form their beliefs about their group members’ contribution in a given period. The estimation 
method is OLS with robust standard errors clustered on sessions as the independent units of 
observation.
14  
Model 1, which only includes “Period”, simply confirms the impression from Figure 1 
that beliefs decline significantly over time. However, this model cannot explain why there is a 
downward trend. Model 2 presents our model of belief formation. We argue that people form 
their beliefs in period t on the basis of their beliefs in period t-1 and the observation of others’ 
contributions in period t-1. To see this, take periods 1 and 2. In period 1 a subject can only 
                                                 
14 We estimated all models with random and fixed effects specifications, as well as with Tobit, with very similar 
results. For instance, the correlation coefficient of predicted values of the Tobit estimation and the OLS is 
0.9995. Since the estimation results are very similar, we only report the OLS results for ease of interpretation.    13
rely on his or her intuitive (“home-grown”) beliefs about others’ contributions. In period 2, he 
or she also makes an observation about others’ actual contribution in period 1. A subject may 
therefore update his or her period 2 belief on the basis of his or her period 1 belief and the 
observed period 1 contributions by others. A similar logic might hold in all remaining periods.  
Model 2 presents the estimates of this belief formation model. We find that both “Belief 
(t-1)” and “Others' contribution (t-1)” are highly significantly positive; “Period” is 
insignificant, an order of magnitude smaller than in Model 1, and not significantly different 
from zero. We also estimated Model 2 separately for periods 1 to 5 and periods 6 to 10. The 
estimated coefficients are very similar in both halves of the experiment (Chow-test, p>0.1).
15 
In other words, the way people form beliefs does not change over time.  
Model 3 is the same as Model 2 except that we drop the insignificant variable “Period”. 
The sum of coefficients of “Belief (t-1)” and “Others' contribution (t-1)” is insignificantly 
different from 1 (F(1,5) = 0.41, p=0.549).
16 We will use this model in our simulations below.  
 
                                                 
15 We also applied an Arellano-Bond linear, dynamic panel-data estimation method (Arellano and Bond (1991)). 
However, there is still significant second order correlation (p<0.05, Arellano-Bond test) in the residuals implying 
that its estimates are inconsistent (Arellano and Bond (1991), pp. 281-282). Moreover, in simulations similar to 
those which we discuss in Section II.E it turned out that the Arellano-Bond estimates cannot explain the data 
patterns at all, whereas Model 3 can. As a further robustness check of Model 2 we also included up to three lags 
for the variable “Others’ contributions”. Only the first lag is significant; the higher lags are very small and 
insignificant.  
16 The period coefficient in Model 2 is insignificantly different from zero but highly significantly different from  
-0.761, the value of the period coefficient in Model 1. For reasons of comparability with Model 2 we estimated 
Model 1 for periods 2-10 only. The period coefficient in Model 1 for all periods is -0.753.    14
TABLE 1—FORMING BELIEFS.  
 
Dependent variable: Belief about other group members’ 
contribution 
Model 1  2  3 
Period -0.761***  -0.079   
 (0.090)  (0.042)   
Others' contrib. (t-1)    0.394***  0.415*** 
   (0.023)  (0.020) 
Belief (t-1)     0.549***  0.569*** 
   (0.037)  (0.036) 
Constant 10.711***  0.835*  0.118 
   (0.864)  (0.398)  (0.148) 
Observations 1260  1260  1260 
R-squared 0.26  0.64  0.64 
Notes: OLS regressions with data from period 2 to 10. Robust standard errors (clustered on sessions) 
in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Given these results, we can summarize the belief formation process as follows: a subject’s 
belief in a given period is a weighted average of what he or she believed about others in the 
previous period and his or her observation of the others’ contribution in the previous period. 
We will use this result when we investigate the role of belief formation for explaining the 
dynamics of voluntary cooperation in section II.E.  
 
D. Explaining Contributions 
In this section we investigate determinants of people’s contributions econometrically. We 
have three explanatory variables – “Period”, “Predicted Contribution”, and “Belief”. We 
estimated three basic models which we document in Table 2. The estimation method is OLS 
with robust standard errors clustered on sessions as the independent units of observation.
17 
                                                 
17 As with belief formation, we estimated all models with random and fixed effects specifications, as well as with 
Tobit. Since the estimation results are very similar, we only report the OLS results.    15
TABLE 2—EXPLAINING CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Dependent  variable:  Contribution 
Model  1 2 3  4a  4b  4c 
Periods  used  1-10 1-10 1-10 1-10  1-5  6-10 
Subjects excluded
+  no no no yes  yes  yes 
Period  -0.639  -0.060      
  (0.071)***  (0.056)      
Predicted      0.242 0.242 0.443 0.385 0.614 
Contribution   (0.069)**  (0.069)**  (0.073)*** (0.074)*** (0.082)*** 
Belief    0.644 0.666 0.545 0.582 0.376 
  (0.071)***  (0.059)***  (0.065)*** (0.065)***  (0.116)** 
Constant  8.343  0.005 -0.473 -0.318 -0.204 -0.116 
 (0.545)***  (0.569)  (0.244) (0.312) (0.541) (0.378) 
Observations  1400 1400 1400 1260  630  630 
R-squared  0.10 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.33 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Models 4a to 4c exclude (confused) subjects who, on the basis of the P-experiment could not be classified 
according to the FGF classification as either a “free rider”, “conditional cooperator”, or a “triangle contributor”. 
 
Model 1, which only includes “Period”, confirms the impression from Figure 1 that 
contributions decline significantly over time. Model 2 adds the variables “Predicted 
Contribution” and “Belief”. We find that both variables matter significantly. In other words, 
in the C-experiments, there is conditional cooperation on top of contribution preferences, but 
there is no significant decline in cooperation that is not explained by “Predicted Contribution” 
and “Belief” (“Period” is an order of magnitude smaller than in Model 1 and not significantly 
different from zero). Model 3 is the same as Model 2 but drops the insignificant variable 
“Period”.
18  
The observations from models 2 and 3 raise two related questions: (i) Why is the 
coefficient on “Predicted Contribution” surprisingly low (it should be one if the elicited 
preferences would predict perfectly)? (ii) Why do people condition their contribution decision 
based not only on their preferences according to their predicted contribution but also on their 
                                                 
18 One might worry about multi-collinearity in models 2 and 3 because beliefs enter the calculation of Predicted 
Contributions. Although Belief and Predicted Contribution are correlated (rho = 0.395), the variance inflation 
factor as an indicator of multi-collinearity is 1.22, which is below the critical value of 5.     16
beliefs? Regression models 4a to 4c shed light on the first question. These models are the 
same as model 3 but exclude “confused” subjects (10 percent) who, according to the 
classification proposed by FGF, could not be classified as either a free rider, a conditional 
cooperator, or as a triangle contributor. Excluding confused subjects seems justified because 
there is no reason why their unsystematic preferences in the P-experiment should predict 
behavior in the C-experiment. Model 4 shows that the coefficient on “Predicted 
Contributions” increases substantially once the confused subjects are excluded. Regression 
models 4b and 4c reveal that there is also a time trend in the relative importance of “Predicted 
Contributions” and “Beliefs”. “Beliefs” seem to be more important for conditional 
cooperation in the first half than in the second half of the experiment (see also Figure B1). In 
the second half the coefficient on “Predicted Contributions” is substantially higher than in the 
first half and also exceeds the coefficient on “Beliefs”.  
Why do beliefs matter on top of contribution preferences? First, note that in the 
regressions 4a to 4c, the constant is not significantly different from 0, and the sum of the 
coefficients for “Predicted Contribution” and “Belief” add up to a number not significantly 
different from 1 (e.g., in regression 4a the sum equals 0.998; F(1,5) = 0.08, p=0.7863). Hence, 
according to these regressions, subjects contribute a weighted average of “Predicted 
Contribution” and “Belief”. A contribution that matches the belief is by definition perfectly 
conditionally cooperative. Thus, subjects behave according to a contribution pattern that is 
inbetween their elicited contribution schedule and perfect conditional cooperation. Since most 
people’s elicited contribution preferences lie below the diagonal, that is, below the schedule 
of perfect conditional cooperators, this intermediate contribution pattern lies above the 
predicted cooperation. This means that subjects are more cooperative in the C-experiment 
than predicted from their decisions in the P-experiment. Regressions 4b and 4c show that this 
is in particular the case in earlier periods; in later periods “Predicted Contribution” becomes 
more important than “Beliefs”.    17
There are two potential explanations for why beliefs matter on top of “Predicted 
Contribution”. First, subjects could have additional reasons for contributing in the C-
experiment that were particularly important in the first periods and are not captured by the P-
experiment. One obvious candidate reason is subjects’ willingness to invest in cooperation in 
order to induce high beliefs and contributions in the population. Such a behavior could be 
motivated by selfishness (although this would not be rational because subjects are rematched 
after each round), or it could be motivated by altruism. Second, due to some form of “self-
deception”, reported beliefs could be lower than the beliefs people actually hold, for example 
in order to avoid disappointment. Admittedly, however, these are speculations, and our 
experiment is not designed to address them. Our experiment is designed to observe the role of 
beliefs and contribution preferences for the decline of cooperation, which we will discuss in 
detail in the next section. 
 
E. Why Do Contributions Decline? 
Because both beliefs and contribution preferences matter for determining contributions, 
the question arises as to how they each contribute to explaining the decline of cooperation. In 
this section we use simulation methods to understand two fundamental issues: do 
contributions decline because of contribution preferences and/or because of the way people 
form their beliefs? What is the role of preference heterogeneity? We use simulation methods 
because they allow us to use counter-factual assumptions which are helpful in disentangling 
the role of preferences and beliefs.  
The simulations are based on a two-stage process. In the first stage, the simulated players 
form a belief about the other players’ contributions. Then, players decide on a contribution, 
which they (partially) base on their beliefs. Before we address our two main questions, we 
make the following basic observations on the conditions under which such a two-stage 
process can explain the decline of cooperation. Contributions will not decline if contributions   18
or beliefs are independent of experience and time, that is, if people are unconditionally 
cooperative or if they have unconditional beliefs. Thus, to explain the decline of cooperation 
both beliefs and contributions need to be conditional. Of course, this is only a necessary 
condition. Suppose, for instance, that belief updating is naïve (that is, beliefs are equal to the 
average contribution in the previous period) and contributions match beliefs. In this case 
cooperation will be stable. Thus, cooperation will only decline if either beliefs are lower than 
naïve beliefs or if people are imperfect conditional cooperators. Our simulations will shed 
light on the relative importance of these two possibilities.  
To be able to disentangle in our simulations the roles of beliefs and contributions for the 
decay of cooperation we make (counterfactual) assumptions about cooperation behavior and 
belief formation. With regard to cooperation behavior we will assume that the simulated 
players (i) contribute according to preferences we have observed in the P-experiment or (ii) 
they (counterfactually) are all perfect conditional cooperators. The second dimension 
concerns belief updating. Here we assume that players either (i) update according to the 
weighted-average model outlined above (Model 3 of Table 1) or (ii) they (counterfactually) 
form their beliefs naïvely. Thus, we have 2×2 combinations of assumptions about cooperation 
behavior and belief formation. Starting from the benchmark of perfect conditional cooperation 
and naïve beliefs we can hold one dimension constant and change the other one to see 
whether belief formation or contributions are responsible for the decay of cooperation.  
The simulations use the exact matching structure that was in place in each period of a 
given session.
19 As starting values we use the actual contributions and beliefs in period 1. The 
details of our 2×2-methodology are as follows:  
1. In our benchmark model, the pCCN-model, we assume that all players are perfect 
conditional cooperators, that is, players match their beliefs exactly: Contribution(t) = 
                                                 
19 That is, in simulation models 3 and 4 described below we replace each human participant by his or her 
contribution schedule and observe how contributions evolve given our assumptions about belief updating.    19
Belief(t). Beliefs are formed naïvely (denoted by sub-index N), that is, Belief(t) = 
Others’ Contribution(t-1). Under these assumptions contributions are obviously stable 
at the initial level of contributions. 
2. The pCCA-model keeps the assumption of perfect conditional cooperation but assumes 
that beliefs are formed according to the actual beliefs estimated in Model 3 in Table 1 
(denoted by sub-index A). In this model, contributions will only drop if beliefs per se 
become inherently pessimistic.
20 Thus, this model reveals the extent to which the 
belief formation process itself is responsible for the decay of cooperation.   
3. The aCCA-model keeps the actual beliefs assumption but replaces perfect conditional 
cooperation by actual conditional cooperation as elicited in the P-experiment (denoted 
aCC). The weights on contribution preferences and beliefs correspond to the estimated 
parameters of Model 3 in Table 2. This simulation model shows the combined 
predicted effects of actual belief updating and actual contribution preferences for the 
decline of cooperation.  
4. Finally, in the aCCN-model the simulated players determine their contributions 
according to the actual conditional contribution schedules but beliefs are updated 
naïvely. By assuming naïve beliefs, this model reveals the extent to which the 
cooperation preferences themselves contribute to the decline of cooperation. 
We address the second question of this section, concerning the role of heterogeneity for 
the decline of cooperation, with two counter-factual models in which we remove 
heterogeneity from the contribution process. By comparing these models with the actual 
contributions we can assess the role of heterogeneity.  The models differ only in their 
assumptions of the belief formation process: 
                                                 
20 “Virtual learning” (Weber (2003)), that is learning with no feedback by just thinking about the problem for 
several periods is a possible reason for this “pessimism”.   20
5. In the iCCN-model players are assumed to be identical conditional cooperators (iCC). 
As a schedule, we use an average linear one: Contribution = α + k*Contribution of 
others. The estimates from the data of our P-experiment return α=0.956 and k=0.425. 
Therefore, in this model Contribution = 0.956 + 0.425*Contribution of others. The 
iCCN-model assumes that belief formation is naïve. Thus, in comparison to the aCC-
models, the iCCN-model informs us about the role of preference heterogeneity of 
players under naïve belief formation. 
6. Finally, the iCCA-model is the same as the iCCN-model but assumes actual belief 
formation.  
Figure 3 depicts the simulation results. We compare the simulation results to the actual 
average contributions (“data”). Panel A illustrates the implications of our simulation models. 
For this purpose we use the average over all six sessions. Panel B depicts the predictive 
success of the aCCA-model at the session level. We illustrate the results of the aCCA-model 
because it is the only simulation model that does not use counter-factual assumptions.  
Since the average initial contribution is 8 tokens, the pCCN-benchmark implies that 
contributions are stable at the initial level. The pCCA-model predicts that contributions will 
decline to the extent beliefs decline. The simulation results return stable contributions. To 
understand this finding recall that according to our model of actual belief formation (Model 3 
of Table 1) Belief(t) = 0.415*Others’ contribution(t-1) + 0.569*Belief(t-1) + 0.118. By 
assumption of perfect conditional cooperation Contribution(t-1) = Belief(t-1) for all players 
and therefore Belief(t) = (0.415 + 0.569)*Belief(t-1). The sum of the two coefficients (0.415 
and 0.569) equals 0.984, which is insignificantly different from 1 (F-test, p=0.549). This 
observation implies that, under perfect conditional cooperation, beliefs remain constant. 
Hence, we conclude that the belief formation process per se does not contribute to the decline   21
of cooperation.
  21 Put differently, beliefs decline because contributions decline and not 
because people become inherently more pessimistic over time, irrespective of contribution 
behavior.  
The aCCA-model and the aCCN-models replace the assumption of perfect conditional 
cooperation with people’s actual contribution preferences as elicited in the P-experiment. 
Both simulation models predict a decline of cooperation. Since beliefs per se are not 
responsible for the unraveling of cooperation we conclude that the decline is triggered by 
people’s contribution preferences. The aCCN-model predicts a much faster decline than we 
actually observe in the data. By contrast, the aCCA-model tracks the actual data quite well. To 
evaluate this model statistically, we regress the actual contributions on the predicted 
contributions (using OLS). We find that the model coefficient (robust s.e.)) equals 1.002 
(0.030), which is not significantly different from 1. The model constant (robust s.e.) equals 
–0.036 (0.188), which is not significantly different from 0. Thus, on average, the aCCA-model 
predicts the data very well. This is also apparent from Figure 3B, which compares the session 
averages with the predictions from the aCCA-model applied to the respective session.  
Finally, we can assess the importance of preference heterogeneity by comparing the aCC-
models with the iCC-models (under both naïve and actual belief updating). By construction, 
the iCC-models eliminate preference heterogeneity by replacing the individual preference 
schedules by the average preference schedule, whereas the aCC-models use the individual 
preference schedules. The comparison shows that preference heterogeneity is surprisingly 
unimportant in explaining the decay of cooperation because the aCC-models and the iCC-
models match each other closely under both naïve and actual belief updating. Heterogeneity 
matters only towards the end of the experiment. In the iCC-models contributions stop 
                                                 
21 If we disregard the constant and take the coefficient of 0.984 literally, the belief formation process per se can 
account for a decline of cooperation of at most 14 percent (i.e., 1-(1-0.984)
9=0.135) over the nine remaining 
periods after period 1.    22
declining towards the end while the models with heterogeneous preferences correctly predict 
the decline also in the last periods. Due to more realistic belief updating, the iCCA-model 
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FIGURE 3. EXPLAINING THE DECLINE OF COOPERATION – SIMULATION RESULTS. PANEL A: 
DISENTANGLING THE SOURCES OF DECLINE. PANEL B: PREDICTING THE DECLINE FOR EACH OF 




Our goal in this study was to investigate the role of social preferences and beliefs about 
others’ contributions for the dynamics of free riding in public goods experiments. We 
achieved this by eliciting preferences in one specially-designed game (the “P-experiment”)   23
and observing contributions and beliefs in ten one-shot standard public goods games with 
random matching (the “C-experiments”).  
We find substantial heterogeneity in elicited cooperation preferences as well as in actual 
contribution behavior. Belief formation is best described as a weighted average of own beliefs 
and others’ contributions in the previous period. Contributions are determined significantly by 
people’s contribution preferences and their beliefs, which matter on top of contribution 
preferences. Surprisingly, people in the C-experiment are more conditionally cooperative than 
suggested by the elicited preferences of the P-experiment.  
These observations imply that for understanding the dynamics of free riding behavior one 
needs to understand both the role of contribution preferences and beliefs. Our findings show 
that contributions decline (in randomly composed groups) because the majority of people are 
imperfect conditional cooperators. Beliefs decline because contributions decline, and not vice 
versa. After some time all types behave like income-maximizing free riders, even though only 
a minority is motivated by pure income-maximization alone.   24
APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
This is a translation of the original German version. We present the instructions of the P-C experiments here; 
those of the C-P experiments were adapted accordingly. They are available upon request. 
 
Instructions for the P-Experiment 
You are now taking part in an economics experiment financed by the Swiss Science Foundation. If you read the 
following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn some more money in addition to 
the 10 Francs, which you can keep in any case. The entire amount of money which you earned with your 
decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. These instructions are solely for 
your private information. You are not allowed to communicate during the experiment. If you have any 
questions, please ask us. Violation of this rule will lead to the exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If 
you have questions, please raise your hand. A member of the experimenter team will come to you and answer 
them in private.  
We will not speak of Francs during the experiment, but rather of points. Your whole income will first be 
calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total amount of points you earned will be converted to 
Francs at the following rate: 
1 point = 35 centimes. 
All participants will be divided in groups of four members. Except for us - the experimenters - no one knows 
who is in which group. 
We describe the exact experiment process below.  
The decision situation 
You will learn how the experiment will be conducted later. We first introduce you to the basic decision situation. 
You will find control questions at the end of the description of the decision situation that help you to understand 
the decision situation. 
You will be a member of a group consisting of 4 people. Each group member has to decide on the allocation of 
20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a 
project. Each point you do not invest into the project, will automatically remain in your private account. 
 
Your income from the private account: 
You will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. For example, if you put 20 points 
into your private account (and therefore do not invest into the project) your income will amount to exactly 20 
points out of your private account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from this account 
will be 6 points. No one except you earns something from your private account. 
Your income from the project 
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you invest into the project. On the other hand, you 
will also get a payoff from the other group members' investments. The income for each group member will be 
determined as follows: 
 
Income from the project = sum of all contributions × 0.4 
 
If, for example, the sum of all contributions to the project is 60 points, then you and the other members of your 
group each earn 60 × 0.4 = 24 points out of the project. If four members of the group contribute a total of 10 
points to the project, you and the other members of your group each earn 10 × 0.4 = 4 points. 
Total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the project: 
Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to the project) 
+ Income from the project (= 0.4 × sum of all contributions to the project) 
Total income 
   25
Control questions: 
Please answer the following control questions. They will help you to gain an understanding of the calculation of 
your income, which varies with your decision about how you distribute your 20 points. Please answer all the 
questions and write down your calculations. 
1.  Each group member has 20 points. Assume that none of the four group members (including you) contributes 
anything to the project. 
 What  will  your total income be?  ___________ 
  What will the total income of the other group members be?  ___________ 
2.  Each group member has 20 points. You invest 20 points in the project. Each of the other three members of 
the group also contributes 20 points to the project. 
 What  will  your total income be?  ___________ 
  What will the total income of the other group members be?  ___________ 
3. Each group member has 20 points. The other 3 members contribute a total of 30 points to the project. 
 a) What  will  your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – invest 0 points into the project? 
   Your Income  ___________ 
 b) What  will  your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – invest 8 points into the project? 
   Your Income   ___________ 
 c) What  will  your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – invest 15 points into the project? 
   Your Income   ___________ 
4.   Each group member has 20 points at his or her disposal. Assume that you invest 8 points to the project. 
  a)  What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – contribute another 
7 points to the project? 
   Your Income ___________ 
  b)  What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – contribute another 
12 points to the project? 
   Your Income ___________ 
  c)  What is your income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – contribute another 22 
points to the project? 
   Your Income ___________ 
 
The Experiment 
The experiment includes the decision situation just described to you. You will be paid at the end of the 
experiment based on the decisions you make in this experiment. The experiment will only be conducted once. As 
you know, you will have 20 points at your disposal. You can put them into a private account or you can invest 
them into a project. Each subject has to make two types of decisions in this experiment, which we will refer to 
below as the “unconditional contribution” and “contribution table”. 
•  You decide how many of the 20 points you want to invest into the project in the unconditional contribution. 
Please indicate your contribution in the following computer screen: 
 
Period  Remaining time [sec]  1 of 1 
Your unconditional contribution  
to the project 
Help 
Please enter your unconditional contribution to the 
project. Press "OK" when you are done. 
 
After you have determined your unconditional contribution, please click “OK”.   26
•  Your second task is to fill in a “contribution table” where you indicate how many tokens you want to 
contribute to the project for each possible average contribution of the other group members (rounded 
to the next integer). You can condition your contribution on that of the other group members. This will be 
immediately clear to you if you take a look at the following table. This table will be presented to you in the 
experiment: 
 
Help: Enter the amount which you want to contribute to the project if the others make 
the average contribution which stands to the left of the entry field. When you have 
completed your entries, press "OK". 
1 of 1  Period  Remaining time [sec] 
Your conditional contribution to the project 
 
The numbers are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the other group members to the project. You 
simply have to insert how many tokens you will contribute to the project into each input box – conditional on the 
indicated average contribution. You have to make an entry into each input box. For example, you will have to 
indicate how much you contribute to the project if the others contribute 0 tokens to the project, how much you 
contribute if the others contribute 1, 2, or 3 tokens, etc. You can insert any integer numbers from 0 to 20 in 
each input box. Once you have made an entry in each input box, click “OK”. 
After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional contribution and have filled in their 
contribution table, a random mechanism will select a group member from every group. Only the contribution 
table will be the payoff-relevant decision for the randomly determined subject. Only the unconditional 
contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision for the other three group members not selected by the 
random mechanism. You obviously do not know whether the random mechanism will select you when you make 
your unconditional contribution and when you fill in the contribution table. You will therefore have to think 
carefully about both types of decisions because both can become relevant for you. Two examples should make 
this clear. 
EXAMPLE 1: Assume that the random mechanism selects you. This implies that your relevant decision 
will be your contribution table. The unconditional contribution is the relevant decision for the other three 
group members. Assume they made unconditional contributions of 0, 2, and 4 tokens. The average contribution 
of these three group members, therefore, is 2 tokens. If you indicated in your contribution table that you will 
contribute 1 token if the others contribute 2 tokens on average, then the total contribution to the project is given 
by 0+2+4+1=7 tokens. All group members, therefore, earn 0.4×7=2.8 points from the project plus their 
respective income from the private account. If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would 
contribute 19 tokens if the others contribute two tokens on average, then the total contribution of the group to the 
project is given by 0+2+4+19=25. All group members therefore earn 0.4×25=10 points from the project plus 
their respective income from the private account. 
EXAMPLE 2: Assume that the random mechanism did not select you, implying that the unconditional 
contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant decision for you and two other group members. Assume your 
unconditional contribution is 16 tokens and those of the other two group members are 18 and 20 tokens. Your 
average unconditional contribution and that of the two other group members, therefore, is 18 tokens. If the group 
member whom the random mechanism selected indicates in her contribution table that she will contribute 1 
token if the other three group members contribute on average 18 tokens, then the total contribution of the group 
to the project is given by 16+18+20+1=55 tokens. All group members will therefore earn 0.4×55=22 points from 
the project plus their respective income from the private account. If, instead, the randomly selected group 
member indicates in her contribution table that she contributes 19 if the others contribute on average 18 tokens,   27
then the total contribution of that group to the project is 16+18+20+19=73 tokens. All group members will 
therefore earn 0.4×73=29.2 points from the project plus their respective income from the private account. 
 
The random selection of the participants will be implemented as follows. Each group member is assigned a 
number between 1 and 4. As you remember, a participant, namely the one with the number 11, was randomly 
selected at the very beginning of the experiment. This participant will throw a 4-sided die after all participants 
have made their unconditional contribution and have filled out their contribution table. The resulting number will 
be entered into the computer. If participant 11 throws the membership number that was assigned to you, then 
your contribution table will be relevant for you and the unconditional contribution will be the payoff-relevant 
decision for the other group members. Otherwise, your unconditional contribution is the relevant decision. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instructions for the C-Experiment 
 
We will now conduct another experiment. This experiment lasts 10 periods, in which you and the other group 
members have to make decisions. As in the other experiment, every group consists of 4 people. The formation of 
the group changes at random after every period. So your group consists of different people in all 10 periods. 
The whole experiment is finished after these 10 periods,. 
 
The decision situation is the same as that described on page 2 of the instructions of the previous experiment. 
Each member of the group has to decide about the usage of the 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your 
private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do not invest into the 
project is automatically placed into your private account. Your income will be determined in the same way as 
before. Reminder: 
 
   
  Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to the project)  
  + Income from the project (= 0.4 × sum of all contributions to the project)   
 Total  income  
  1 point = 7 centimes!   
 
The decision screen, which you will see in every period, looks like this: 
 
Period  1 of 10  Remaining time [sec] 
As you can see, you have to make two inputs: 
 
1.  First you have to decide on your contribution to the project, that is, you have to decide how many of the 
20 points you want to contribute to the project, and how many points you want to put into your private 
account. This decision is the same as the unconditional contribution of the previous experiment. You only 
make unconditional decisions in this experiment. There is no contribution table. 
 
Help 
Press "OK" when you have completed your entries 
What is your estimate of the average contribution from the OTHER group 
members in this period (rounded to an integer? 
Your contribution to the project 
Your endowment   28
2.  Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to the project (rounded to an integer) of the other 
three group members of this period. You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate: 
 
•  If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate is exactly the same as the actual average 
contribution of the other group members), you will get 3 points in addition to your other income from 
the experiment. 
•  If your estimate deviates by one point from the correct result, you will get 2 additional points. 
•  A deviation by 2 points still earns you 1 additional point. 
•  If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you will not get any additional 
points. 
 
After these 10 periods are over, the whole experiment is finished and you will receive: 
  +  your income from the first experiment 
  +  your income from the second experiment (including your income from your correct estimates) 
  =  total income from both experiments 
  + 10 Francs show up fee ! 
 
   29
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